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Abstract: Using a unique data set covering four years and six semi-annual sales periods 
of an index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) product in southern Ethiopia, we examine 
the dynamics of pastoralists’ demand for IBLI. We find that: (1) there is intertemporal 
dependence of an uptake decision, represented by correlations of unobserved household 
factors over time; (2) conditional on previous purchase decisions, factors related to 
continuing the purchase of IBLI to augment existing coverage and replace lapsing 
contracts differ significantly; (3) controlling for time-invariant household-fixed effects, 
neither a one-shot subsidy nor the uptake of others in one’s social network influence 
subsequent demand, whereas less vegetation and reduced insurance premiums induce 
households to purchase IBLI. Overall, our study provides rigorous micro-evidence to 
better understand the dynamic uptake of IBLI and signifies the importance of an 
empirical analysis that takes into account the dynamic demand structure.  
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1. Introduction  
Index-based insurance products hold great promise for protecting the poor in 
developing countries who are vulnerable to weather risks, such as droughts and floods. 
Existing studies show that index insurance is welfare-enhancing, not only by 
compensating losses through payouts, which help smooth consumption and reduce 
distress sales of productive assets in the face of downside risks, but also by stimulating 
policyholders to change their production decisions toward more risky, but more 
profitable activities, generating higher production and income (Karlan et al., 2014; 
Nicola, 2015; Cai, 2016; Cole et al., 2017; Jensen et al., 2017; Bertram-Huemmer and 
Kraehnert, 2018; Janzen and Carter, 2019; Hill et al., 2019; Matsuda et al., 2019; 
Noritomo and Takahashi, 2019). It has also been shown that index insurance coverage 
improves buyers’ subjective well-being even without payouts (Tafere et al., 2019).  
Despite its demonstrated welfare gains, the uptake of index insurance has remained 
low across many of the contexts in which it has been introduced. Research has identified 
several important factors affecting uptake, including basis risk (i.e., the deviation 
between actual losses and losses predicted by the index) (Gine et al., 2008; Mobarak 
and Rosenzweig, 2012; Jensen et al., 2018), household risk and ambiguity preference 
(Gine et al., 2008; Hill et al., 2013; Belissa et al., 2019b; Bryan, 2019), upfront 
premium payments (price) and credit constraints (Cole et al., 2013; Gine et al., 2008; 
Ntukamazina et al., 2017; Casaburi and Willis, 2018; Belissa et al., 2019a), a lack of 
trust and understanding (Cole et al., 2013; Ntukamazina et al., 2017; Belissa et al., 
2019a), and social network and existing alternative risk-management mechanisms 
(Mobarak and Rosenzweig, 2012; Dercon et al., 2014; Cai et al., 2015; Sibiko et al., 
2018; Takahashi et al., 2019). Due to data constraints, most research in this field has 
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focused on insurance demand at one point in time. Thus, limited attention has been paid 
to the dynamics of demand for index insurance. This has left several important 
issues—such as the prevalence of and factors related to continuous adoption and 
dis-adoption—largely unanswered.  
This study contributes to the literature by revealing the dynamic decision-making 
process involved in insurance uptake. The product under study is index-based livestock 
insurance (IBLI) introduced in the Oromia region in southern Ethiopia in 2012. Most 
households in this region are pastoralists, primarily relying on extensive livestock 
grazing for their livelihood. Recurrent droughts have historically occurred every six to 
seven years, causing widespread livestock mortality and thus substantially threatening 
the pastoralists’ lives. Furthermore, the existing customary informal insurance 
arrangements, such as lending livestock to those who are in need, have been eroding 
over time (Lybbert et al., 2004; Huysentruyt et al., 2009; Santos and Barrett, 2011). In 
this setting, IBLI is expected to offer a formal mechanism to protect pastoralists against 
otherwise uninsured drought risk.  
Using unique panel data from over 450 households which cover four years and six 
semi-annual IBLI sales periods from August 2012 to February 2015, we first describe 
the IBLI adoption and dis-adoption rates among purchasing households. We then apply 
econometric analysis to explore various factors related to dynamic household 
decision-making. We primarily focus on a binary purchase decision, rather than the 
quantity to insure, to understand why specific households appear to be repeat purchasers 
(non-purchasers) and what factors lead to their decision-making patterns.  
More concretely, we first closely assess each sales-period decision using a 
multivariate probit model. This model allows the unobserved error terms to be 
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correlated over time, which helps us better understand the extent to which, and when, 
the uptake decisions are intertemporally correlated due to factors not accounted for by 
observable characteristics. We then examine the dynamic adoption behavior, conditional 
on previous IBLI purchases. We use a Heckman probit model for this analysis, where 
the second stage is implemented separately for half a year later and a year later. This 
allowed us to obtain insight into whether factors related to augmenting insurance 
coverage (half a year later) and replacing the lapsing contract (a year later) differ for our 
insurance product whose policies last for one year. Finally, we apply a household-fixed 
effect estimator to control for time-invariant observed and unobserved characteristics 
and examine the role of time-varying exogenous factors, including contemporary and 
lagged weather shocks, the insurance uptake of other people in the social network, and 
the subsidized price offered to a random subset of the sample at each sales period. 
Our study primarily contributes to the literature on the demand for index insurance, 
particularly in relation to its dynamic aspects. A handful of studies on the dynamics of 
insurance demand have revealed that one’s own experiences with insurance payouts as 
well as those of one’s network members positively affect the subsequent uptake (Cole et 
al., 2014; Hill et al., 2016; Karlan et al., 2014; Stein, 2018). Meanwhile, a one-time 
subsidy to reduce insurance premiums does not dampen the subsequent uptake, 
suggesting that there are no price-anchoring effects related to the subsidy (Takahashi et 
al., 2016; Matsuda and Kurosaki, 2019). Using panel data which cover six sales periods 
over four years, we reconfirm the absence of price-anchoring effects. Moreover, 
departing from previous studies which have focused extensively on the impacts of one’s 
own and others’ payouts, we investigate other channels through which past uptake 
decisions affect subsequent purchase decisions. After controlling for observed 
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household characteristics, our study reveals that households that have bought insurance 
once tend to buy it repeatedly, regardless of payouts. It also reveals that their decisions 
are not substantially affected by the decisions of others in their social network.  
Our study also speaks to the literature on the demand for IBLI among pastoralists in 
southern Ethiopia, which has been based on shorter observations than ours. Using data 
from the two rounds of sales windows, Takahashi et al. (2016) find that the demand for 
IBLI is insensitive to better knowledge of the product, represented by correct answers to 
a quiz about the product. Bageant and Barrett (2017) show that there is no 
discrimination of demand based on the gender of household head. Tim et al. (2018) 
show that receiving payouts, either by policyholders or their network members, does not 
affect subsequent uptake. We do not revisit several issues, such as the role of knowledge 
and receiving payouts, to avoid the complexity related to endogeneity concerns and 
simply repeat the same previous exercises. Instead, using longer-term data with multiple 
specifications, we extend those previous studies for a firmer understanding of the 
drivers of, and barriers to, the demand for IBLI.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the study setting 
and descriptive statistics; Section 3 explains our estimation strategies; Section 4 
discusses the results; and Section 5 presents the conclusions with policy implications.  
 
2. Study Setting 
2.1. Study area  
This study was conducted in the Borana plateau in the Oromia regional state of 
southern Ethiopia. The study area comprised arid and semi-arid ecological zones, 
characterized by a bimodal rainfall pattern with four seasons: two rainy seasons from 
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March to June (Gaana) and October to November (Hagaya), and two dry seasons from 
July to September (Adolessa) and December to February (Boonahagaya). Most of its 
population practices a pastoral livelihood, typically owning cattle, camel, goats, and/or 
sheep. These transhumant households often maintain semi-permanent settlements and 
mobile herds which search for pasture and water in the face of seasonal forage scarcity. 
These pastoralists are overwhelmingly poor and extremely vulnerable to weather shocks, 
particularly droughts, which have occurred regularly since the 1970s (i.e., 1973/74, 
1983/84, 1991/92, 1999/00, 2005/06, and 2011/12). In this region, widespread market 
failures combined with drought-related livestock mortality cause many pastoralists to 
slip into a poverty trap. This forces them to suffer poverty for prolonged periods 
(Lybbert et al., 2004; Santos and Barrett, 2011; Takahashi et al., 2019).  
 
2.2. IBLI product 
To help pastoralists manage drought risk and protect livestock assets, IBLI was 
introduced by the Oromia Insurance Company in partnership with the International 
Livestock Research Institute and Cornell University in 2012. Its design followed a 
successful pilot project in the Marsabit district of northern Kenya, which was rolled out 
in 2010 (Chantarat et al., 2013, Jensen et al., 2017). Although IBLI contracts have been 
updated several times since its launch, this study focuses on the one that was active at 
the time of data collection.  
IBLI uses an index of relative forage scarcity based on remotely sensed and freely 
available data collected by satellite (Chantarat et al., 2013, Takahashi et al., 2016). 
There are two IBLI sales windows each year, occurring in January-February and 
August-September, directly before each rainy season. Insurance premium rates vary 
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across geographic regions based on estimates of drought-related mortality risk. The 
premium paid is the premium rate multiplied by the total insured herd values (TIHV), 
which reflect the value of each animal species.1 Contracts cover one full year. There are 
two potential payout periods, in October and March, immediately after each dry season. 
Payouts are triggered if the index falls below the 15th percentile of the empirical 
distribution of the index since 1981. The amount of payouts depends on the realized 
normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI) and TIHV. If a household purchases 
IBLI in two consecutive sales periods, the household can have overlapping policies and 
could receive payouts on both (Ikegami and Sheahan, 2015).  
 
2.3. Research design 
The household survey covered 17 reeras (hereafter the study site, equivalent to a 
sub-district containing 100–300 households) in eight woredas (local administrative unit 
that encompasses reeras) in Borana: Dilo, Teltele, Yabello, Dire, Arero, Dhas, Miyo, 
and Moyale. The study sites were selected depending on the balance between logistical 
challenges and geographic distribution in the sites, so as to capture variation in 
agro-ecology, access, and livelihood. In each study site, census data of households were 
first collected and then households were split into wealth terciles based on the number 
of livestock held. At each site, 15% of households were selected for this study, one third 
from each of the livestock-holding terciles.  
The first round of the household survey was conducted for 515 households in March 
                                                   
1 Total insured herd value (in ETB) = (number of camels insured × 15,000) + (number of cows 
insured × 5,000) + (number of goats and sheep insured × 700) from the first to the third sales periods. 
After the third sales period, the insurance company revised the values of animals, responding to 
opinions from local communities. The revised total insured herd value (in ETB) from the fourth to 
the sixth sales periods = (number of camels insured × 10,000) + (number of cows insured × 6,000) + 
(number of goats and sheep insured × 800). 
9 
 
2012, prior to the first sales period of IBLI in August 2012. Thereafter, follow-up 
surveys were conducted annually every March until 2015, totaling four annual surveys. 
To maintain a sample size of around 500 households, attritted households were replaced 
by other households from the same site that had similar tropical livestock unit (TLU) 2 
holdings with the attritted households.  
To stimulate IBLI uptake and increase people’s awareness of it, discount coupons 
were distributed to a randomly selected sub-sample of study households, allowing them 
to purchase IBLI at a premium discount for the first 15 TLUs insured in the season. 
Discount rates ranged from 10% to 80% of the insurance premiums. The distribution of 
discount coupons was independently re-randomized for each sales period. Thus, coupon 
recipients and realized discount rates changed across the sample households over time. 
In each sales period, one-tenth of the sample households received a 10% discount; 
another tenth received a 20% discount, and so on up to a maximum discount rate of 
80%. Each season, 20% of the sample households did not receive a discount coupon.3 
IBLI had been sold six times by the end of the survey panel in 2015.  
In this study, we use data from 458 balanced panel households that remained in the 
sample for the entire panel survey period. Appendix Table 1 shows the baseline 
household characteristics of those attritted and non-attritted households, with a t-test for 
equality of means. Most household characteristics are not systematically different 
between the two groups, and an F-test across the entire set of characteristics reveals that 
they are not jointly, statistically, and significantly different from zero. Given the overall 
balance, we consider that the attrition in our sample is mostly random and the exclusion 
                                                   
2 One tropical livestock unit is equivalent to 1 cow, 0.7 camel, or 10 goats or sheep. 
3 Ten households received a 100% discount for a specific purpose related to a parallel, but separate 
study. 
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of attritted households should not significantly bias our inferences. 
 
2.4. Summary statistics  
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the 458 balanced-panel households at the 
baseline. Panel A shows that, on average, households have 6.3 members and are headed 
by a male with less than one year of formal education. Most households are poor; the 
mean annual household income per capita is about 4,300 Ethiopian birr (ETB)4, while 
the mean annual household expenditure per capita is 3,800 ETB. Using the international 
poverty line standard of an expenditure of 1.90 US dollars per day (2011 purchasing 
power parity), more than 56% of households are classified as extremely poor. 
Households depend heavily on livestock-rearing for their livelihood, including milk and 
meat production, which accounts for an average of 71.5% of total household income. 
Livestock also comprises these households’ main non-human asset, with average 
holdings of 14.7 TLU, dominated by cattle (11.7 TLU, representing 80% of total TLU) 
and supplemented by goats and sheep (1.5 TLU), as well as camels (1.5 TLU).  
To examine the role of risk preferences in insurance demand, we implemented an 
ordered lottery selection following Binswanger (1980). Each respondent was offered a 
chance to choose one of the six lotteries with payouts in birr of (50, 50), (45, 95), (40, 
120), (30, 150), (10, 190), and (0, 200). This was implemented using coin flips and real 
cash payouts. A respondent is considered highly risk-averse if he/she chose either of the 
first two options, moderately risk-averse if he/she chose either of the middle two 
options, and less risk-averse if he/she chose one of the last two. About 12%, 46%, and 
42% of the respondents belonged to the first, second, and third categories, respectively 
                                                   
4 USD 1 is equivalent to 20.46 birr as of March 31, 2015, while USD 1 is equivalent to 4.92 birr in 
2011 purchasing power parity.  
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(Panel B).  
Panel C shows the number of households that purchased IBLI during the six sales 
periods. While livestock is by far the most vital asset, the demand for livestock 
insurance was not very high. More than 40% of the households never bought IBLI and 
only 1.5% bought it in all six windows.  
Table 2 shows the most important reasons why the sample households did not 
purchase IBLI, summarized by each survey round (IBLI 1 to IBLI 6). The number of 
observations differs because this question applies only to those that did not hold 
effective insurance coverage at each survey round. The top reason reported for not 
purchasing is a lack of comprehension of the insurance product (“Did not understand 
insurance well enough to buy it”), even though this percentage declined over time. 
However, using the same data set as in this study, Takahashi et al. (2016) show that 
improved knowledge through the provision of a learning kit, such as a comic and tape, 
does not result in improved uptake. The second most important reason is lack of 
liquidity (“Don't have money to spend on insurance”) followed by lack of opportunity to 
buy it (“Did not have an opportunity to buy it”). Although everyone in the sample was 
eligible to buy IBLI at each sales period, sample households live far apart from each 
other and it is possible that the insurance agents did not visit all the survey locations for 
every sales season.5  
Table 3 shows the average premium discount rate, the cumulative standardized 
                                                   
5 Using baseline household characteristics as covariates, we run a multinomial probit model to 
examine factors correlated with the reasons for not purchasing index-based livestock insurance 
(IBLI). The baseline category of the outcome includes all other reasons aside from the lack of 
understanding, money, opportunities, and animals. The result, presented in Appendix Table 2, is 
mostly consistent with intuition. For example, households with less educated heads are more likely 
to consider lack of understanding as a major barrier, while those with less animals, as well as female 
heads, are more likely to consider lack of animals and money as the major barriers to purchase IBLI.   
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NDVI zero to six months before the sales period6, and the dynamic patterns of IBLI 
uptake from the first to the sixth sales periods between 2012 and 2015.  
Panel A of Table 3 shows the uptake rates for each sales period and the number of 
TLU insured. Generally, the uptake rate was moderate, ranging from 13% to 30%, and 
higher in the August-September periods (i.e., IBLI 1, 3, and 5) than the 
January-February sales periods (IBLI 2, 4, and 6). Given that the policy covered one 
year, it seems reasonable to observe a recurring pattern of higher uptake in the odd sales 
periods because those who purchased IBLI in the first sales window were eligible to 
receive payouts until the following year. The uptake rates declined across years, with 
the exception of a slight improvement from the IBLI 1 to the IBLI 3 sales periods. As 
shown in Table 2, an increasing number of people became skeptical about the 
effectiveness of IBLI over time (i.e., the number of people who raised “afraid,” “waiting 
on others’ results,” “do not think IBLI helps,” and “do not trust insurance companies” 
as major reasons for not purchasing IBLI increased over time), reducing the insurance 
uptake.  
Following the terminology of Jensen et al. (2018), Panel B of Table 3 presents the 
frequency of: (1) the total number of “purchasing” households, (2) a new purchaser 
(“New”) who buys IBLI for the first time, (3) an augmenter (“Augment”) who 
purchases additional coverage that overlaps with existing coverage; (4) an insurance 
holder (“Holding”) who does not purchase IBLI but has existing coverage; (5) a 
replacing individual (“Replacement”) who buys IBLI when the previous policy lapses; 
(6) an individual who lapsed (“Lapsed”) whose past policy has lapsed and they do not 
purchase additional coverage; and (7) a reentering individual (“Reenter”) who buys 
                                                   
6 The intertemporal changes in the cumulative standardized normalized difference vegetation index 
by study site are presented in Appendix Figure 1.  
13 
 
IBLI at the current period and buys it before the previous one lapses. By definition and 
insurance design, the sum of “Augment” and “Holding” is equivalent to the number of 
total purchasing households in the previous sales period, whereas the sum of 
“Replacement” and “Lapsed” is equivalent to the total number of households that held 
the policy in the previous sales period.  
Several findings are noteworthy. First, a non-negligible number of households that 
purchased IBLI in a previous sales period augmented it in the current period. Indeed, the 
augmenting rate [(3)/[(3)+(4)]] was approximately 18% to 62% in the IBLI sales 
periods 2–6. This seems to reflect that households could not afford to insure the desired 
level of livestock at once due to cash and credit constraints, or that they expanded the 
insurance period given the same amount of money. Second, among those who held 
contracts, more than half replaced (renewed) their insurance coverage in the 3rd sales 
season. However, over time they did not do so, thus allowing their coverage to lapse. 
The rate of lapsed contracts [(6)/[(5)+(6)]] was approximately 46% to 79% during the 
IBLI sales periods 3–6. Similarly, 30% to 58% of those who had purchased IBLI one 
year ago neither augmented nor replaced their coverage before it lapsed. 7 These 
statistics reflect the short-term dis-adoption rates. Third, once policyholders let their 
contracts lapse, they usually did not re-enter the market. However, dis-adoption and 
non-reentering are somewhat expected, particularly if policyholders do not receive 
indemnity payments. Indeed, according to our field interviews in 2015, most households 
specified lack of payouts when they purchased IBLI as a major reason for not 
                                                   
7 These numbers are obtained by [ (4)t+1 – (5)t+2 ]/(1)t. For example, 38% (=(104-56)/127) of 
households who purchased IBLI at period 1 did not augment IBLI at period 2, and did not replace 
IBLI at period 3.  
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re-entering the market.8  
 
3. Estimation Strategy  
To examine a variety of factors associated with the dynamic patterns of demand for 
IBLI in more detail, we conduct regression analysis. We first examine a set of probit 
models for each sales period, allowing the error terms to be correlated over time. We 
then examine the demand for IBLI conditional on previous purchase decisions. Finally, 
we examine the role of time-variant factors in IBLI uptake, using a household-fixed 
effect estimator.  
 
3.1. IBLI purchase at each sales period  
We first estimate factors associated with the uptake for each sales period. Let  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖∗𝑡𝑡 
be the latent dependent variable and 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 1 if household i purchases IBLI in sales 
period, t. A set of equations can be written as follows:  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡 = �1  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖∗𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 > 00 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 , t = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5,6}  (1) 
where 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡  is the vector of equation-specific coefficients to be estimated; 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is the 
vector of household characteristics at the baseline; and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the corresponding error 
term. We can estimate this system of equations using a probit model separately if the 
error term, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 , is independent across equations. However, if they are correlated, 
estimated parameters may be biased. Thus, we use a multivariate probit model that 
allows the error terms to be correlated over time. We assume that 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  follows a 
                                                   
8 Payouts were observed once in November 2014 against the June to September 2014 drought. 
Those who purchased IBLI at the third and fourth sales periods were eligible to receive payouts. As 
noted in the introduction, see Tim et al. (2018) for details on the impact of payouts on subsequent 
purchases.  
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multivariate normal distribution with a mean of zero and the variance-covariance matrix 
∑, where ∑ has values of 1 for the leading diagonal and correlations as 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 =
𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  (𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑘𝑘) for off-diagonal elements. A positive covariance estimate suggests that 
those who (did not) purchase IBLI at the previous period are more (less) likely to buy it 
again in a later period. We are particularly interested in whether a positive 
autocorrelation, if any, can only be observed every two sales periods (i.e., when the 
former contract lapses) or even every subsequent sales period (which may indicate 
inter-period persistency).  
To avoid estimation bias arising from reverse causality, we use the baseline data as 
covariates, which were collected before IBLI was launched in the region and before any 
extension or discount treatments were implemented. The set of baseline household 
characteristics include: (1) demographics of the household and household head, such as 
household size and age, years of completed education, and gender of household head; 
(2) annual per capita household income and the proportion of household income from 
livestock; (3) household livestock holdings, measured in TLU; (4) the value of 
non-livestock assets; and (5) risk preference dummies elicited through field experiments 
(reference category is highly risk-averse). In addition to those baseline characteristics, 
we also include woreda dummy variables that function as controls for unobserved 
differences between study sites, as well as a premium discount rate randomly distributed 
at each sales period. We do not include weather- and pasture-related variables, such as 
NDVI, as the available data vary only at the study site level, which are captured by 
woreda dummies.9  
 
                                                   
9 The premium discount rate is orthogonal to the error term because the distribution of discount 
coupons is random.  
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3.2. The dynamics of IBLI uptake  
While the multivariate probit model can identify the (non-)existence of 
intertemporal correlations of uptake decisions, it does not allow us to fully understand 
factors related to the dynamic purchase patterns. Therefore, we examine the initial and 
subsequent purchase decisions simultaneously using a Heckman probit model (Van de 
Ven and Van Pragg 1981), allowing the purchase of IBLI for each sales period to be 
contingent upon previous decisions.  
Let 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 be a binary variable equal to one if household i buys IBLI at time t-1. 
Then, the set of our estimation models can be specified as follows:  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 = �1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1∗ = 𝛼𝛼−1𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽−1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 > 00 otherwise  (2a) 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = �1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝛼𝛼0𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽0 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 > 00 otherwise   iff 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1∗ > 0 (2b) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1∗  and 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∗  are the latent variables for the observed demand status at time t-1 
and t, respectively; 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is the vector of household characteristics at the baseline, which 
is the same in the multivariate probit model; 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 and 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 are the discount premium 
rates for household i for the previous and current periods, respectively; 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡  is the 
sales-period-fixed effects; 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 ,𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡, and 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡+11  are parameters to be estimated; and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 
and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  are the error terms, jointly distributed as bivariate normal with means equal to 
zero. We implement the second-stage analysis separately for half a year later and a year 
later from the initial period given that factors related to augmenting insurance coverage 
(half a year later) and replacing the lapsing contract (a year later) may differ.  
 
3.3. IBLI purchase with household-fixed effect  
Finally, we estimate the linear probability model with the household-fixed effect. 
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Because all time-invariant characteristics, including observed baseline characteristics, 
are absorbed in household-fixed effects, this exercise focuses on the role of time-variant 
factors, including the current and lagged exogenous weather shocks, others’ uptake in 
the social network, and premium discount coupons provided in each sales period. We 
also include one’s own lagged uptake.  
Our regression model can be written as:  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾3𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 + 𝛾𝛾4𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁 + 𝛾𝛾5𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾6𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡 + 𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑢𝑢𝐽𝐽𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (3) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is one if household i buys IBLI at sales period t; 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  is the 
sales-period-specific discount rate; 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 is a dummy variable for IBLI purchase at the 
previous sales period, which is expected to capture the learning-by-doing effect; 
𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 and 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁  are average IBLI uptake rates of one’s network members at the current 
and previous sales periods, respectively; 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 are the cumulative 
standardized NDVI over zero to six months before the current and previous sales 
periods (i.e., either March to September or October to February), respectively; Jan is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the sales period is January to February; Round is the 
survey round-fixed effect; and 𝜃𝜃 is the household-fixed effect.  
To elicit ones’ social network to construct the average IBLI purchase in their 
network (i.e., 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 and 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁 ), we conducted a network survey in 2015 via a “random 
matching within sample method,” following Conley and Udry (2010).10 We assigned 
each respondent to eight households randomly drawn from the sample and asked 
whether the respondent knows the match. Five out of eight matches were selected from 
the same study site, while the remaining three were selected from relatively far away, 
                                                   
10 For more details of the sampling method, see Takahashi et al. (2019).  
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outside the community but within a 40–50 km radius of the respondent’s permanent 
residence. To reduce recall and reporting errors as much as possible, we provided 
respondents with the match’s information, such as age, clan, and residential location. It 
was revealed that most respondents did not know three matches living outside the 
community (Takahashi et al., 2019). Thus, we focus on five matches within the 
community and construct 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 and 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 𝑁𝑁 as:  
    𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 = #𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁# 𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 and 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁 = #𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑁𝑁# 𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 (4)  
where the denominator of the right-hand side is the number of matches (out of five) who 
respondent i knows well (we call this the network member).11 The numerator of the 
right-hand side is the number of network members who purchase IBLI at sales period t 
for 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 and t-1 for 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁 . Because we implement the network analysis only once, the 
denominator does not vary over time while the numerator does.  
Admittedly, this exercise ignores the possibility that interventions can alter the 
underlying network structure (Comola and Prina 2017; Advani and Malde 2018). To 
mitigate the potential endogeneity bias, we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach 
where the current and previous-period average discount rates of network members are 
used as IV for 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 and 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 𝑁𝑁 , respectively. We also use the lagged discount rate as IV 
for 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1. Since the use of multiple endogenous and IVs would lead to an overly 
complex estimation and sensitive results, we also check them in the reduced form 
without any IV, as well as those with potential endogenous variables separately included 
in the explanatory variables. The summary statistics of the average uptake in one’s 
network for each sales period are presented in Appendix Table 3.  
 
                                                   
11 No sample household has zero as the denominator.  
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4. Estimation Results  
4.1. IBLI purchase at each sales period  
Table 4 shows the estimation results of each period-specific uptake decision through 
the multivariate probit model. Standard errors are clustered at the study site level. As 
expected, households that receive higher discount rates are more likely to purchase IBLI 
in most periods. The result holds throughout with the exception of the second sales 
period. While we do not observe any other systematic patterns, there is a tendency for 
households with a better-educated head to purchase IBLI, presumably because they 
understand the product more. The gender of the household head affects the demand 
slightly, which is consistent with the findings of Bageant and Barrett (2017).  
Per capita income tends to be positively correlated with purchase, indicating that 
financial liquidity matters. Herd size is also generally positively correlated with 
purchase, although mostly not statistically significant. Despite the fact that IBLI focuses 
on compensation for livestock losses, there is no evidence that the share of livestock in 
the total income is significantly correlated with IBLI uptake.  
Contrary to conventional economic theory, less risk-averse households are more 
likely to buy IBLI, which is also the finding of Gine et al. (2008). This is especially 
obvious at the first period uptake, presumably because there is possible uncertainty 
about the insurance product and the provider when the insurance product is new to this 
area. Thus, those who can tolerate risk are more eager to buy IBLI. This is consistent 
with the fact that a lack of understanding of the product was the most common 
explanation cited by households for not purchasing insurance. Similarly, the household 
head’s years of education has a positive impact on insurance uptake at the first sales 
period.  
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Table 5 reports the results of the correlation of error terms. Most of them are 
positive and statistically significant, except between the 1st and 2nd periods (negative but 
insignificant). This implies the existence of an unobserved bifurcated tendency, where 
those who have experienced purchasing IBLI once tend to repeatedly purchase IBLI, 
and at the same time, there exists a certain group of people who never buy IBLI. It is 
important to find the positive relationships, even for consecutive sales periods, although 
overlapping could reduce the demand in successive sales periods.  
Given the structure of the error terms, we also test the extent of bias caused by 
ignoring the autocorrelation in the error terms. Appendix Table 4 presents the results of 
separate regressions for each sales period by a binary probit model. We find that the 
signs of coefficients are mostly consistent with those of the multivariate probit model. 
However, there are some differences in the coefficient and statistical significance level, 
which signifies the importance of taking autocorrelation into account, even though the 
extent of bias is not large. 
 
4.2. The dynamics of IBLI uptake 
Next, we turn to the dynamic decision model in Table 6, estimated by a Heckman 
probit model. Column 1 presents the previous period uptake and Column 2 is the uptake 
in the current sales period, conditional on the previous purchase. These cover t-1 and t 
sales periods, which correspond to the overlapping sales periods. Since the first sales 
period does not have observations for t-1, the number of observations becomes 
458×5=2,290. Columns 3 and 4 present results of similar exercises, but they cover sales 
periods t-2 and t, which corresponds to the time when the insurance coverage at t-2 has 
lapsed. Only the observations from the third to the sixth sales periods can be used in 
21 
 
Columns 3 and 4, which yields 458×4=1,832 observations in total. There are some 
households that augment insurance coverage at the t-1 sales period. However, given that 
our focus is on the decision concerning replacement as well as the factors determining 
replacement or the discontinuing of insurance uptake, we exclude those augmenting 
households in Columns 3 and 4, generating 1,696 observations. Standard errors are 
clustered at the study site level again.  
The factors associated with the initial uptake in Columns 1 and 3 are mostly similar 
with the previous results via the multivariate probit model. That is, households with 
higher premium discount rates, better-educated heads, higher per capita income, and 
less risk aversion are more likely to purchase IBLI than others.  
Subsequently, we look at factors related to continuous IBLI uptake in consecutive 
periods. The estimation results significantly differ between the initial and continuous 
uptake. Contrary to the initial uptake in Column 1, household characteristics, such as 
the head’s education and per capita income do not significantly affect continuous IBLI 
purchase, while less risk-averse households are more likely to stop purchasing. Given 
that some households have already experienced the product, some uncertainties about 
the product and the companies providing it would have been addressed. Thus, it is 
intuitive that more risk-averse households tend to buy insurance, as the conventional 
economic theory predicts. Households with larger herd size are likely to continue 
purchasing, presumably because they are less likely to face binding credit constraints or 
because they value the loss of livestock more than those who are asset poor. 
The factors associated with renewing the contract also differ from those associated 
with augmenting the contract. Generally, household characteristics tend to matter more, 
as presented in Column 4. For example, household size is negatively correlated, and the 
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gender of the head is positively correlated with renewing the contract. The age of the 
head has an inverted-U-shaped relationship. The coefficient on the head’s years of 
education is negative and significant for the decision to replace the contract or not. This 
is probably because those who understand the product better are likely to discontinue it 
if they are disappointed by the result. Household risk preference is no longer the crucial 
determinant, conditional on the initial purchase. 
  
4.3. IBLI purchase with household-fixed effect  
Finally, we estimate the household-fixed effects that effectively control for 
time-invariant observed and unobserved household characteristics to better understand 
the role of time-variant factors. The estimation result is presented in Table 7, where 
Panel A presents the ordinary least squares (OLS) results while Panel B presents the IV 
results. The dependent variable is the household’s binary purchase decision for each 
sales period. Because of the autocorrelation in the error term which we found in the 
multivariate probit estimation, we cluster the standard error at the household levels.  
The main findings are as follows. First, consistent with the previous results 
(Takahashi et al., 2016), the contemporary discount rate positively affects the uptake, 
while the lagged discount rate has no direct impact, showing no price-anchoring effects 
(Column 1). The latter result validates our identification strategy, where the lagged 
discount rate is used as an instrument for the lagged uptake, which satisfies the 
exclusion restriction. Second, the coefficient on the January/February sales period is 
negative and significant, supporting the recurring pattern of uptake within a year, as we 
confirmed in the descriptive statistics. Third, the current (zero to six months before the 
current purchase) and lagged NDVI (seven to twelve months before the current 
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purchase) have negative impacts on the probability of IBLI purchase, with the former 
having a large impact. This result suggests that households exploit ecological signals 
when making purchase decisions by buying IBLI when they anticipate a bad season. 
This is perhaps because vegetation conditions do not change immediately and past 
NDVI can be a good predictor for future NDVI, or pastoralists become willing to buy 
IBLI once animals get weaker due to poor vegetation. Fourth, one’s own lagged uptake 
has a negative impact on the subsequent uptake in the reduced form using OLS (Panel A, 
Column 2). However, its sign turns positive once we appropriately instrumentalize this 
endogenous choice, which is our preferred estimation (Panel B, Column 2). This 
confirms that those who purchase IBLI tend to repeatedly purchase it not only because 
of the unobserved persistency which we found in the previous sub-section, but also 
because of behavioral traits. The result suggests the existence of some positive learning 
effects, wherein those who purchase and understand the product are more likely to 
repeatedly buy it. However, the result does not stand up to a robustness check when we 
instrumentalize all potential endogenous variables, although the sign remains positive 
(Panel B, Column 5). Furthermore, while the contemporary and lagged uptake of 
acquaintances have positive impacts on one’s own uptake in the reduced form (Panel A, 
Columns 3–5), its statistical significance disappears once we use the IV methods (Panel 
B, Columns 3–5). This appears reasonable because the previously mentioned study 
reveals that most pastoralists do not know the status of the actual uptake of others, even 
if they are in the same social network (Takahashi et al., 2019).  
To check whether our results are robust if we include the two-lagged-period 
variables, we extend the analysis of Equation (3). For potential endogenous variables, 
such as one’s own lagged uptake and the uptake of others in one’s network, we again 
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apply the IV method by using the corresponding one’s own and network members’ 
period-specific premium discount rates as IVs. The numbers presented in Appendix 
Table 5 show that the results are mostly similar to those having only one-lagged period. 
We confirm that the premium discounts in the prior two sales periods have no direct 
impact on the current uptake, suggesting no price-anchoring effects in this extended 
model as well. Moreover, we find that even the two-period lagged NDVI negatively 
affects the current uptake. Partly because of the reduction of the sample size due to the 
inclusion of two-period lagged variables, we fail to reject the significant impact of the 
one-period-lagged-own uptake on the current purchase through the IV method, even 
though the sign is positive.  
Overall, we find little evidence that others’ uptake affects one’s own decision in the 
demand dynamics for IBLI. Meanwhile, we observe weak, suggestive evidence of 
learning by doing effects, represented by positive coefficients of one’s own lagged 
uptake.  
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications  
Index insurance has attracted much attention in developing countries due to its 
ability to protect the poor from climate risks. Despite the associated potential large 
gains, one puzzling observation is that the uptake of index insurance remains low. Using 
four-year, six-sales-period data collected in southern Ethiopia, this study investigated 
the dynamic uptake patterns and the underlying mechanisms of the uptake of IBLI.  
We first find that households with higher per capita income, more risk-tolerance 
and higher education of household heads are more likely to buy IBLI. These results may 
suggest that it is those relatively better-off that have better access to and possibly 
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benefit more from IBLI. The results are largely consistent with the other settings in the 
literature with shorter-term data, suggesting external validity of our findings (e.g., Gine 
et al., 2008; Cole et al., 2013; Hill et al., 2013; Jensen et al., 2018; and Ntukamazina et 
al., 2017). Although we confirm that reduced insurance premiums effectively increase 
the insurance uptake without lowering future demand, how to better reach the poorer 
segment of the society who are more vulnerable to climate risks and need the insurance 
most is obviously an important agenda for future research.  
We also find that controlling for the baseline household characteristics, there is 
autocorrelation in the error terms over time, indicating that a household that purchases 
IBLI once is more likely to purchase coverage again. This autocorrelation is not 
explained by a standard set of household characteristics. We confirm that the existence 
of autocorrelation results in a biased estimate if we analyze the decisions for each 
period’s uptake separately, even though the extent of bias is not very substantial. Our 
findings further suggest that the factors associated with the initial and subsequent 
uptake significantly differ, and household characteristics tend to matter more when we 
consider households’ dynamic decisions about whether to renew the lapsing contract. 
These results highlight the importance of an empirical analysis that takes into account 
the dynamic demand structure with the long-term data.  
Finally, conditional on time-invariant household characteristics, we find that the 
uptake of others in one’s network do not influence one’s own demand, whereas we 
observe some suggestive evidence of positive learning-by-doing effects. While the 
results are weak, our study reveals other channels than payout effects through which 
past uptake decisions affect subsequent purchase decisions, which is also confirmed in 
the existence of autocorrelation discussed above. Overall, our study provides solid 
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micro-evidence to better understand the dynamic uptake of index insurance in a longer 
term than usually considered in the literature.  
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Table 1: Baseline Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Household Characteristics     Panel B: Risk Preference   
Household size 6.264 
 
Highly risk averse (=1) 0.124 
 
(0.116) 
  
(0.330) 
Age of head 50.485 
 
Moderate risk averse (=1) 0.456 
 
(0.852) 
  
(0.023) 
Sex of head (=1 if male) 0.793 
 
Less risk averse (=1) 0.419 
 
(0.019) 
  
(0.023) 
Years of education of head 0.600 
   
 
(0.103) 
 
Panel C: # Purchase IBLI 
 Annual household income per capita (000ETB) 4.324 
 
0 0.419 
 
(0.223) 
 
1 0.192 
Ratio of livestock per total income 0.715 
 
2 0.205 
 
(0.033) 
 
3 0.107 
Annual household expenditure per capita (000 ETB) 3.754 
 
4 0.061 
 
(0.112) 
 
5 0.013 
Extreme poverty (=1) 0.572 
 
6 0.002 
 
(0.023) 
   Herd size (TLUs) 14.639 
   
 
(1.048) 
   Non-livestock asset value (000 ETB) 2.917 
     (0.232)  # Obs 458 
 Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis
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Table 2: Most Important Reason for Why Households Did Not Purchase IBLI 
  2nd 
 
3rd 
 
4th 
  No. % 
 
No. % 
 
No. % 
Did not understand insurance well enough to buy it 96 29.0 
 
73 23.0 
 
59 16.9 
Don't have money to spend on insurance 70 21.1 
 
74 23.3 
 
68 19.4 
Did not have an opportunity to buy it 48 14.5 
 
60 18.9 
 
72 20.6 
Don't have enough animals 39 11.8 
 
64 20.1 
 
61 17.4 
Afraid of uncertainty in insurance 2 0.6 
 
16 5.0 
 
24 6.9 
Waiting to see what happens to the people who bought the 
insurance 
11 3.3 
 
8 2.5 
 
23 6.6 
Don't think insurance will help me 7 2.1 
 
9 2.8 
 
19 5.4 
Don't trust any insurance companies 3 0.9 
 
4 1.3 
 
10 2.9 
Other  55 16.6 
 
10 3.1 
 
14 4 
Total 331 100 
 
318 100 
 
350 100 
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Table 3: Dynamic Patterns of IBLI Uptake 
Sales period   IBLI1 IBLI2 IBLI3 IBLI4 IBLI5 IBLI6 
Panel A 
       
Average discount rate (%)  38.035 38.450 38.210 38.035 38.384 38.384 
  (29.147) (28.798) (28.894) (28.890) (29.055) (28.904) 
Cumulative normalized NDVI  -16.809 10.435 1.980 2.179 5.033 2.955 
  (4.606) (1.911) (4.924) (2.619) (8.286) (2.780) 
Uptake Rate 
 
0.277 0.194 0.303 0.129 0.216 0.127 
  
(0.448) (0.396) (0.460) (0.335) (0.412) (0.333) 
TLU insured conditional on purchase 
 
2.459 2.469 2.644 2.380 1.985 2.312 
    (3.206) (3.857) (5.267) (4.301) (3.439) (4.365) 
Panel B 
       
(1) # Purchased HH 
 
127 89 139 59 99 58 
(2) # New 
 
127 66 28 10 23 12 
(3) # Augmenting 
 
0 23 55 31 27 28 
(4) # Holding 
 
0 104 34 108 32 71 
(5) # Replacement 
 
0 0 56 7 28 8 
(6) # Lapsed 
 
0 0 48 27 80 24 
(7) # Reentering   0 0 0 11 21 10 
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Table 4: Period-Specific Uptake Decision (Multivariate probit estimation) 
 
Note: Clustered standard errors at the study site level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 
5, and 10 percent critical level.   
IBLI 1 IBLI2 IBLI 3 IBLI 4 IBLI 5 IBLI 6
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contemporary d iscount rate 0.011*** 0.001 0.004** 0.010*** 0.004* 0.007**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Household size 0.001 0.019 -0.001 -0.023 -0.068*** 0.012
(0.022) (0.033) (0.028) (0.035) (0.019) (0.043)
Age of head -0.013 -0.020 -0.030 0.049* 0.016 0.038*
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.027) (0.016) (0.020)
Age of head squared 0.085 0.129 0.235 -0.367 -0.118 -0.388**
(0.189) (0.175) (0.179) (0.234) (0.151) (0.180)
Years of education head 0.064*** -0.024 -0.003 0.083** 0.049 0.003
(0.024) (0.029) (0.017) (0.035) (0.059) (0.048)
Sex of head (= 1 if male) -0.158 -0.217 -0.113 0.153 0.228 -0.199
(0.186) (0.160) (0.173) (0.199) (0.278) (0.205)
Annual household income per cap ita (000ETB) 0.006 0.012 0.027** 0.037* -0.007 -0.020
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019)
Ratio of livestock per total income 0.382* 0.070 0.181 -0.090 -0.036 0.200
(0.227) (0.098) (0.240) (0.298) (0.084) (0.235)
Herd size (TLUs)/000 2.137 5.062 3.885 -15.745*** 1.264 2.371
(4.453) (4.084) (6.048) (4.888) (3.874) (4.017)
Non-lievstock asset value (000 ETB) -0.003 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.010 -0.017
(0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017)
Less risk averse (= 1) 0.667*** 0.228 -0.086 -0.125 0.326* -0.174
(0.188) (0.190) (0.167) (0.237) (0.191) (0.217)
M oderate risk averse (= 1) 0.425** 0.193 -0.348* -0.180 0.301 0.108
(0.200) (0.158) (0.192) (0.253) (0.207) (0.236)
Constant -1.551** 0.272 0.184 -3.211*** -5.851*** -2.903***
(0.624) (0.613) (0.640) (0.838) (0.341) (0.452)
W oreda fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 458 458 458 458 458 458
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Table 5: Correlation of Error Terms 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
IBLI 1       
      
IBLI 2 -0.008      
(0.101)      
IBLI 3 0.630*** 0.617***     
(0.119) (0.097)     
IBLI 4 0.434*** 0.321* 0.485***    
(0.124) (0.186) (0.146)    
IBLI 5 0.423*** 0.180* 0.250*** 0.465***   
(0.106) (0.104) (0.070) (0.138)   
IBLI 6 0.240*** 0.316** 0.271*** 0.374*** 0.437***  
(0.081) (0.129) (0.076) (0.138) (0.108)  
Note: Clustered standard errors at the study site level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 
5, and 10 percent critical level.  
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Table 6: Dynamic Uptake Model (Heckman probit estimation) 
 
Note: Clustered standard errors at the study site level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 
5, and 10 percent critical level.  
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Table 7: Dynamic Uptake Model with Household Fixed Effect  
 
Note: Clustered standard errors at the household level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 
5, and 10 percent critical level.    
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Appendix Figure 1. Cumulative Standardized NDVI  
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Appendix Table 1: Baseline Characteristics of Attrited and Non-attrited Households 
 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level. Standard deviations are in bracket. 
Attreted Non-attrited Difference
(1) (2) t-test
Household size 6.018 6.264 -0.247
[0.305] [0.116]
Age of head 44.105 50.485 -6.379**
[2.222] [0.852]
Sex of head(=1 if male) 0.702 0.793 -0.091
[0.061] [0.019]
Years of education of  head 0.351 0.600 -0.250
[0.212] [0.103]
Per capita household income (000ETB) 4.999 4.324 0.675
[0.662] [0.223]
Ratio of livestock per total income 0.762 0.715 0.047
[0.038] [0.033]
Per capita household expenditure (000ETB) 3.842 3.754 0.089
[0.355] [0.112]
Extreme poverty (=1) 0.526 0.572 -0.046
[0.067] [0.023]
Non-lievstock asset value (000 ETB) 2.560 2.917 -0.357
[0.479] [0.232]
Herd size (TLUs) 15.839 14.639 1.199
[2.567] [1.048]
Less risk averse (=1) 0.456 0.419 0.037
[0.067] [0.023]
Moderate risk averse (=1) 0.456 0.456 -0.000
[0.067] [0.023]
woreda==Arero 0.175 0.192 -0.017
[0.051] [0.018]
woreda==Dhas 0.018 0.052 -0.035
[0.018] [0.010]
woreda==Dillo 0.228 0.166 0.062
[0.056] [0.017]
woreda==Dire 0.105 0.096 0.009
[0.041] [0.014]
woreda==Moyale 0.105 0.041 0.064**
[0.041] [0.009]
woreda==Teltele 0.175 0.168 0.007
[0.051] [0.017]
woreda==Yabello 0.123 0.214 -0.091
[0.044] [0.019]
woreda==Miyo 0.070 0.070 0.000
[0.034] [0.012]
Number of observations 57 458
F-test of joint significance (F-stat) 1.171
40 
 
Appendix Table 2: Reasons for Not Purchasing (Multinomial probit estimation) 
 
Note: Baseline category is other reasons than lack of animal, money, understanding, and opportunity to buy. Clustered 
standard errors at the study site level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
critical level.     
(base=Others) (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Animal Money Understanding Opportunity
Household size 0.044 0.007 0.023 -0.011
(0.032) (0.020) (0.015) (0.038)
Age of head 0.027 0.048 0.061* 0.049*
(0.020) (0.030) (0.032) (0.027)
age of head squared -0.183 -0.429 -0.573** -0.469*
(0.147) (0.282) (0.288) (0.240)
Years of education head -0.017 -0.050 -0.076* -0.060***
(0.054) (0.055) (0.043) (0.021)
Sex of head (=1 if male) -0.464** -0.664*** -0.209 -0.136
(0.184) (0.149) (0.184) (0.237)
Annual household income per capita (000ETB) -0.050 0.013 -0.002 -0.011
(0.037) (0.033) (0.018) (0.015)
Ratio of livestock per total income 0.111 0.024 0.106*** 0.145**
(0.084) (0.089) (0.030) (0.074)
Herd size (TLUs)/000 -73.320*** -22.014** 4.553* 4.714
(15.862) (8.792) (2.356) (4.918)
Non-livestock asset value (000ETB) -0.020 -0.054*** -0.018 -0.027
(0.022) (0.017) (0.023) (0.023)
Less risk averse (=1) 0.333 0.331 0.038 -0.042
(0.340) (0.228) (0.166) (0.217)
Moderate risk averse (=1) -0.025 0.165 -0.005 -0.183
(0.263) (0.171) (0.126) (0.184)
Constant 0.173 -0.185 -0.902 -1.890***
(0.909) (0.873) (0.815) (0.552)
Woreda fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Round fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,009 1,009 1,009 1,009
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Appendix Table 3: Summary statistics of average uptake in the network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis
Sales period Uptake in Network 
1 0.265 
 
(0.240) 
2 0.187 
 
(0.219) 
3 0.288 
 
(0.230) 
4 0.122 
 
(0.167) 
5 0.215 
 
(0.224) 
6 0.129 
 
(0.178) 
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Appendix Table 4: Separate Probit Regressions for Each Sales Period 
  IBLI 1 IBLI2 IBLI 3 IBLI 4 IBLI 5 IBLI 6 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Contemporary discount rate 0.013*** 0.001 0.003* 0.012*** 0.005 0.007** 
 (13.64) (0.52) (2.00) (5.90) (1.56) (3.10) 
Household size -0.004 0.020 -0.007 -0.027 -0.073*** 0.010 
 (-0.14) (0.71) (-0.30) (-0.93) (-3.30) (0.26) 
Age of head -0.016 -0.018 -0.025 0.044 0.015 0.038 
 (-1.08) (-0.85) (-1.40) (1.62) (1.51) (1.91) 
Age of head squared 0.116 0.108 0.195 -0.318 -0.097 -0.376* 
 (0.84) (0.65) (1.30) (-1.53) (-0.90) (-2.34) 
Years of education head  0.059 -0.020 -0.003 0.090*** 0.054*** 0.001 
 (1.92) (-1.26) (-0.13) (4.64) (3.77) (0.05) 
Sex of head (=1 if male) -0.129 -0.257 -0.067 0.127 0.227 -0.192 
 (-1.01) (-1.38) (-0.35) (1.05) (1.10) (-1.15) 
Annual household income 
per capita (000ETB) 
0.002 0.014 0.020 0.033 -0.011 -0.015 
 (0.09) (1.03) (1.52) (1.55) (-0.87) (-0.58) 
Ratio of livestock per total 
income 
0.364 0.063 0.118 -0.103 -0.022 0.114 
 (1.27) (0.61) (0.66) (-0.31) (-0.30) (0.42) 
Herd size (TLUs)/000 2.326 5.165 3.675 -15.546** 1.736 3.128 
 (0.51) (1.09) (0.55) (-2.68) (0.33) (0.53) 
Non-livestock asset value 
(000 ETB) 
-0.003 -0.001 0.005 0.005 0.007 -0.018 
 (-0.21) (-0.05) (0.74) (0.23) (0.55) (-1.33) 
Less risk averse (=1) 0.676** 0.182 -0.009 -0.035 0.395 -0.133 
 (2.67) (0.85) (-0.04) (-0.16) (1.88) (-0.89) 
Moderate risk averse (=1) 0.480* 0.140 -0.261 -0.088 0.375 0.164 
 (2.26) (0.97) (-1.94) (-0.32) (1.41) (0.72) 
Constant -1.622** 0.243 0.150 -3.187*** -6.268*** -2.950*** 
  (-2.92) (0.39) (0.24) (-3.40) (-19.04) (-4.56) 
Woreda fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 458 458 458 458 458 458 
Note: Clustered standard errors at the study site level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 
5, and 10 percent critical level. 
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Appendix Table 5: Dynamic Uptake Model with Household Fixed Effect (Two-lagged) 
 
Note: Clustered standard errors at the household level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
critical level.   
Panel A: OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Discount rate (t) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged discount rate (t-1) 0.001
(0.000)
Two lagged discount rate (t-2) -0.000
(0.000)
Lagged uptake (t-1) -0.146*** -0.200***
(0.034) (0.039)
Two lagged uptake (t-2) -0.110*** -0.168***
(0.040) (0.037)
Average uptake of network members (t) 0.084 0.116
(0.072) (0.073)
Lagged average uptake of network members (t-1) 0.118* 0.160**
(0.062) (0.068)
Two lagged average uptake of network members (t-2) -0.009 0.077
(0.060) (0.060)
NDVI (t) -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Lagged NDVI (t-1) -0.004* -0.004* -0.006** -0.005* -0.004* -0.003 -0.004* -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Two laggd NDVI (t-2) -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004*** -0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
January dummy -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.076*** -0.111*** -0.087*** -0.109*** -0.096*** -0.093***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Constant 0.196*** 0.224*** 0.252*** 0.254*** 0.200*** 0.205*** 0.225*** 0.232***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.032) (0.033) (0.038) (0.032) (0.035) (0.052)
Round fixd effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832
Panel B: Instrumental variable method (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Discount rate (t) 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged uptake (t-1) 0.555 0.320
(0.401) (0.385)
Two lagged uptake (t-2) -0.011 0.081
(0.234) (0.245)
Average uptake of network members (t) -0.805 -0.573
(0.558) (0.717)
Lagged average uptake of network members (t-1) 0.172 0.540
(0.641) (0.808)
Two lagged average uptake of network members (t-2) 0.718 0.649
(0.593) (0.747)
NDVI (t) -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.007*** -0.011*** -0.014**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Lagged NDVI (t-1) 0.002 -0.004** -0.008** -0.002 -0.003 0.005
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.012)
Two lagged NDVI (t-2) -0.002 -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.003 -0.005*** -0.004
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
January dummy -0.163*** -0.096** -0.168*** -0.115 0.009 -0.147
(0.059) (0.043) (0.059) (0.084) (0.091) (0.233)
Round fixd effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832
